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AbstractwThls l~per deals with the problem of how to supply an exl~ustible r source which is 
available by extraction or by recycling. Two decision makers are assumed to ccmtrd either extraction 
or recycling. Hence, these is a duopolistic market. This marlwt is modeiled by nonsero-sum differential 
games. The solution concepts chosen are the open-loop Nuh and Stackelberg equllibri~ the latter 
ones subsequently with both pbtyers as lead¢~ or fonower, I~q~ctiveiy. The open loop concept is 
although the equilibria do not need to be subgmne l~rdect. However, they give some insight 
into short,.term pl~n~ig strategies and can be easily cc~npsred with analogous model- due to this 
topic. A wide range of literature shout extraction and/or caammlption f exhaustible r sources is 
related to methods of Optimal Control Theory with open-loop controls. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Most continuous models dealing with the optimal extraction of an exhaustible resource and its 
substitution by other commodities or by new production technologies are related to monopolistic 
markets or to pure competition. 
However, aggregation of the resource xtractors, on the one side, and of the producers of 
the same commodity, on the other side, leads to an oligopolistic market structure. Hence, in 
this paper, we will discuss the problem: how to supply the resource, which is assumed to be 
necessary for production of a consumption good, if this resource can be produced either by 
extraction or by recycling. The term '~ecycling" means that the resource can only be reproduced 
at an amount which cannot exceed the total amount of the resource already extracted. This 
assumption corresponds to the setting of durable exhaustible resources in the sense of [1]. The 
resource stock available for extraction is assumed to be fixed and of known amount. 
We will discuss this problem by means of a differential game with two players---or in terms of 
price theory: with two oligopolists--namely the extractor and the recycler. 
Several solution concepts, with given price and cost functions are discussed: The Nash equilib- 
rium and the Stackelberg equilibria with both, the extractor and the recycler as leader, respec- 
tively. 
We assume the demand to be exogenously given that the market will always be cleared. We 
restrict our analysis to open-loop strategies since all the information is available at initial time and 
the strategies do not need to be updated at each instant of time. This concept is chosen although 
the equalibria do not need to be subgame perfect (see [2]); further, in the case of Stackelberg 
equilibria, there can arise time consistency problems. 
In spite of these well-known shortcomings the results give information, which can be compared 
with the one in the literature of this topic, where methods of Optimal Control Theory are applied 
in an analogous manner. 
2. THE MODELS 
2.1. One State Model 
Let T denote the fixed and finite time horizon, u(t) the extraction rate, v(t) the recycling rate 
and y(t) the amount of the resource being in circulation. 
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The dynamics of the state variable y are given by 
~(t) = ~(t) + (~(t) - 1) y(0, y(0) = y0 > 0, t • [0,~q. 
Obviously, this equation implies that the whole circulating amount of the resource is available 
for recycling. This assumption is simplifying the analysis without crucial implications to the 
results. 
The price function is assumed to depend on the circulating amount: 
p = p(p(t)), withp'(y) < 0 andp"(p) < O. (1) 
The extraction costs, cz > O, are assumed to be constant and the recycling costs are assumed 
to depend on y: 
C2 = C2(y(t)), with c2'(y) < 0 and c~(y) _> 0. (2) 
This assumption means that the costs of recycling are growing with the decrease of the amount 
of the resource available for recycling. 
The payoffs are given by 
~0 T J1 - (p(y) - Cl) u e -r'z dr, for the extractor, 
and 
J~ = (p(y) - c2) v y e -r2t dt, for the recycler, 
where ri ( / -  1,2) denotes the discount rates of the two players. The control variables u and v 
are restricted to the admissible control regions 
y0 
u(t) • [0, ~], with ~ _< -~-, (3) 
and 
~(t) • [o, ~], with ~ < 1, for ~u t • [0, T]. (4) 
The restriction of the extraction rate u yields that total exhaustion of the resource stock is 
impossible before reaching the time horizon T. This very simplifying assumption will be dropped 
in the extension of this model, where the resource stock still being in earth will be comddered in
detail. 
~.~. Two States M~c l  
We introduce the resource stock not yet extracted, x(t), as the second state variable; hence, 
we have the two state equations 
~(t) = -u (0 ,  ~(0) = ~o, (5) 
~(t) -- u(t)  + (v(t)  - 1) y(t),  y(O) -- yo. (6) 
The extraction costs are also assumed to be stock dependent: 
cz - cz(z(t)), withc~(x) < Oandci'(z ) <_ O. (7) 
We have the same payoffs as above; the constraints due to the extraction rate, however, are 
changed as follows: 
u _> 0 and u(t) dt _< z °. (3') 
This restriction is equivalent to 
x(t) > 0, for ~ut • [0,T]. 
The restriction for the recycling rate is unchanged. 
In this extension, the problem of total exhaustion of the resource stock z which can be exploited, 
will be discussed, while the circulating amount y of the resource only tends asymptotically to 
zero, due to the state equation (6). 
P.esom-ce xtraction 
3. SOLUTION CONCEPTS 
197 
$.1. aVasl, Equilibria 
A pair of control functions (u', v') is called a Nash equilibrium point, if 
Jx(u',v*) > Jx(u,v'), 
J2(u',~') > J2(u',v) 
for all feasible u, and 
for all feasible v. 
$.1.1. One S~ate Model 
Necessary conditions for (u*, v*) being a Nash equilibrium can be derived by the ma~mum 
principle as follows. The Hamiltonians 
H I = (p - ¢i)  u e - ra t  + ~1 (u -~ ('o - 1) y), 
I I  ~ = (I' - c~) v y e - '~t  + ~2 (u + (v - I) y) 
are linear with respect o the control variables u and v, and hence we have bang-bang controk 
with switching functions 
.,(t) = H~ = (p-  c~) e-'" + ~,  
~2(t) = H~ = (p-  c2) y e -r~' + ~2 U. 
The adjoint equations are 
L = -H ,  ~ = -p ' (y)  u e - ' "  + ~ (I - ~), ~(T)  = 0, (ga) 
,~2 - -H~ -- - [ ( f (y )  - c2'(y)) v y - (p - c2) v] e - ' "  + ,~2 (I - v), ,~2(T) -- 0. (8b) 
The best response controls are given by 
0 ) { ~ < (c~ -p)e  -''t, (9a) 
u*(t) - indetermined , if ~I - (ci -p )e  - ' ' t ,  (9b) 
~ > (~ - p) e-'", (9~) 
and 
v*(t) = indetermined , if = (c2 - p) • -r-t, (10b) 
0 > (c2 - p) • - ' t .  (10c) 
In both cases, we have for singular solutions (i.e., the switching functions equal sero) the eco- 
nomic interpretation that the shadow price of a unit of the resource to be extracted or recycled, 
respectively, equals the difference between the costs and the price. If there is no extraction for 
a further instant of time, the circulating amount p of the resource is decreasing, and hence the 
price is increasing. 
Since the extraction costs ¢t are constant, the extractor will obtain higher profit if he waits for 
this increase of the price without extracting, i.e., the case (gb) can be dropped, and we actually 
have 
u" (t) = , if ~x > (Cl - p) • - r ' ' .  (9c) 
Since the recycling cesta increase with decreasing y,singular solutions are possible for the recycler. 
Hence, we have the following six policy regimes. 
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i) Reoime (u* = v* = 0): 
Since (p(#) - ci)e - ' '~ + hi < O, (i = 1, 2), either the shadow prices ~i of a further unit of 
the resource amount ~/, or the profits, or both are negative. Hence, no one of the two players is 
interested in an increase of I/. By the state equation, we obtain 
~(t) = ~0 e-*. 
i 0 Regime (u* = O, v* undetermined): 
For the extractor, we have the same situation as in the first regime. The recycler's profit equals 
the negative shadow price of the resource: 
-a~=(p(u) -=~(~) )e  - ' , ' .  
Differentiating this equation with respect o time and using the sdjoint equation (8b), we 
obtain by rearranging 
~(t) = (1 + r~) p(y) - c2(u) 
Since y(t) _> 0 must hold for all t, this equation only applies if 
p(v) >_ c2(u), andp'(u) < c2'(u), or 
p(u) _< c2(y), andp'(U) > c2'(U). 
Then the recycler's profit is positive and the price decreases stronger than the recycling costs, or 
the profit is negative; the price, however, decreases slower than the costs. 
iii) Regime (u* = O, v* = 0): 
Since (p (y ) ,  c~(I/)) e -r2t + ~2(t) > 0, the profit and/or the shadow price is positive and, hence, 
it is--in any cast. best to produce the resource at the highest possible recycling rate: 
(i) ff (p - c2) e -r2t > 0, then either A2(t) _> 0, or ~2(t) < 0, with l~21 < p - c=o 
(ii) If (p - c2) c -r2t _< 0, then ~2(t) > 0, with ~2(t) > ]p - c2[ e -~2t. 
By the state equation, we obtain 
~(t) = V ° e (e-x)t. 
iv) Reoime (u* = fi, v* = 0): 
Since (p(y) - ex)e -rl~ + Ax(t) > 0 and (10(1/) - c2(y))e -r2* + ~2(t) < 0, it is profitable for the 
extractor to supply the resource and, hence, he extracts at the highest possible xtraction rate, 
while either the recycler's profit and/or the respective shadow price is negative. If in the latter 
case the profit is positive, the price decreases stronger than costs do, if one unit of the resource 
will be produced by recycling. 
For the amount Zl, we have 
v) Re0ime (u" = u, v" undetermined): 
In the same way as in the second regime, one derives 
(1 + r, ~ (p(u) - c,(u) 
y(z)  = k~/ \~ ' (u )  - ~(u) / "  
Once spin,  this equation only applies if the risht-hand side is nou-neptive sad the reeydim~ 
rate can be computed by inte~ating the state equation. 
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vO Regime (u* = fi, v* = ~): 
Since (p(y) - el) + Ai(t) > O, (i = 1,2) it is obviously profitable for both players to produce 
the resource at highest possible rates. The circulating amount is 
y(t)=eC._,) ,(y o f4 ) f, . . - - . - -~_ .  
I "~  + l -v  
Switching Points: 
A. For the extractor, we have, by the transversality condition A,(T) = 0 and, hence: 
(i) If (p(T) - e,) > 0, we have maximal extraction fi at the end of the planning horizon 
and 
Ax(T) = -p'(y) fie - ' 'T  > 0. 
So, there exists a point of time tl', with A,(t) < 0, for all t G [tl',T]. Ifp(y °) > cl, 
then ~x' = 0; else, tl ' can be computed by the equation 
p(W(~ll)) " Cl -- A1($11). (11) 
Since y is strictly decreasing with time, a. switching point only can occur if there exists 
a point of time t1" with Al(t) < 0 and Al(t) < 0, for all t G (tl",tl']. Hence, u* = 0 
over this interval, this yields AI(L) - A1(1 - v) and hence Ax(t) - e (1-~)1 > 0, in 
contradiction to Equation (11). Consequently, there is no switch from zero extraction 
to maximal extraction. 
(ii) If (p(T) - cl) < 0, we have zero extraction at the end of the planning horizon mad 
~I(T) = 0, and hence, there exists a point of time {1 with A,(t) = 0, for all t G [{,,~/~. 
However, y(t) >_ y(T) for all t E [0, T], and this yields u* - 0 for the whole period. 
B. For the recychr, we have, by the transversality condition A2(T) = 0 and, hence, to distin- 
guish the following three cases: 
(i) (p(T) - c2(T)) > 0 and, consequently, v'(T) = ~ and 
A2(T) = - [(p'(T) - c2'(T)) y - (p(T) - c2(T))] v e -r2T. 
Subcase h p'(T) - cs'(T) > 0: We have i2(T) < 0 and, hence, there exists a t~' with 
A2(t) > 0 for all t 6 [t2',T], and t2' can be computed by the equation 
-(p'(t2') - = p(t2') - 
Subcase 2: p'(T) - c~'(T) < 0: t2' is a switching point, or there exists t~ with t~ < t2' 
and v* = ~, for all t 6 [1~, T], and t~ can be computed by the equation 
p i t  #~ C I~#~ L 2 ) - -  2L 2) " -0 .  
(ii) if (p(T) - c2(T)) < O, we have no recycling at the end of the planning horizon, and 
A2(T) = O. 
Then, there exists is", with As = 0 for all t e [ts",T], i.e., a switching point can only 
occur if (p -  c2) is decreasing in time. This, however, yields p'(y) > cs'(y) and, hence, 
t2' is the switching point. 
(iii) if (p(T) - c2(T)) = 0, we have 
( c2(y) 
y(r) = A = 0, with A # 0. 
This is a contradiction to the state equation (6). 
CAI4HA 24:81g-N 
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3.1.P,. Two States Model 
The Hamiltoniaus are given by 
H 1 -" (p  - Cl)  u e - r ' t  - Al l  u -~- A12 (u -~- (~ --  1) y) + Pll u + P12 z, 
H 2 = (p - c2) v ye -''~ + A2~ (u + (v - 1) y) - ~22 ~, 
and are again linear with respect o the control variables; hence, the switching functions are 
O.l(t) ._ (~(y)  --  C I (~))  e - - r l ,  _ ~11 "~f ,~12 "~ ,11 ,  (12)  
~(t )  = (~(y) - c~(y)) y e -~ '  + ~,  y. (13) 
The costate quations are 
~, ( t )  - ~(z)  ue -r ' '  - p~2, ,~,(T) -- 0, (14) 
~(~) = -p ' (~) .  ~- ' , '  - ~ (1 - ~), ~(T)  = 0, (15) 
~x(~) = (c~'(~) - p ' (~) ) ,  ~ e -~ '  + (c~ - p) ~ e - '~'  + ~ (1 - ~), ~(T)  = 0. (1~) 
Since H 2 does not depend on the state variable z, the costate quation for A22 vanishes over 
the whole time. For the dummy variables, the conditions 
must apply. 
and 
pt1~_0, P l lu=0,  and (17) 
/~12 > 0, P12 z = 0, (18) 
The best response controls are given by 
{ 0 ){ (p -c l )e - r "<~ix - .~12-p lx ,  (19a) 
u*(t)= ind. , if (p -c l )  e - r~t=)~xt -A12-pH,  (19b) 
fi (p - cl) e -r~t > ~n - ~x2 - P11, (19c) 
{:d}  { (p -  c2)e-r~ < -~21' (20a) 
v ' (0  = . , if (p -  c2) e -r~* = -~21,  (~0b) 
(p- c~) ~-~' > -~.  (2o0 
Since the extraction costs in this model are not constant and the shadow prices for the stocks 
are concerned to the other player, respectively, we have nine policy regimes. 
i) Regime (u* = v* = 0): 
By the state equations, we obtain 
z ( t )=z  ° and y(t)=y°e-t. 
By the transversality conditions, A0 - 0, for i,j E (1,2) must hold. Since pll _> 0, each player's 
profit is negative (see inequalities (19a) and (20a)) and the shadow prices are zero. 
ii) Regime (u* = O, v* indetermined): 
The costate quation (15) yields ~12(t) = A12(1 - v), hence A12 ---- 0, due to the transversality 
condition. The switching function (13) leads to 
~21 = (C2(~l) - -  p (y ) )  e -v2t ,  
and by differentiation with respect o time, equating the derivative with the right-hand side of 
the costate quation (16), and by rearranging, we derive 
y(t) = (1 + r~) (c2(~) -p (~)  
\ f (y )  - c~, (y ) / '  
if this equation exists (i.e., p'(y) ~ c2'(y)). 
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iii) Regime (u* -- O, v* - ~): 
By the state equations, we obtain 
z ( t )=z  ° and y(t)=y°e(e-1)*. 
Condition (20c) applies, and the same interpretation holds as in Section 3.1.1. 
iv) Regime (u* indetermined, v* = 0): 
Condition (19b) yields (if constraint (3)' is not binding) 
~xx = (p(y) - e l (X))  e -r~' + ~h,  
differentiating this equation with respect o time and equating with the coetate quations (14) 
and (15), one derives 
U*(t) = rl[(2"I-r l)p'(Y)Y-I-P't(y)y2-I '(1-krl)(P(Y)- Cl(Z))] ifu* E [O, fi]. 
p/'(~/) y-[- (1 "[-rl) f (y  ) 
v) Regime (u* and v* indetermined): 
Anedogous calculations lead to the following relation between both control variables: 
[~'(y)-p'(y)).. c,'(y)-f(y) ~ 
v" = \ e2(y) p(y)  c~(y) - p(y)  
Obviously, the control variables are proportional to each others, and the proportionality depends 
on prices and recycling costs only. 
vi) Regime (u* indetermined, v* = 0): 
The usual calculation shows 
rX [pOO(~I)~I(1--~)-- (~) (p (~/ ) -  Cl(Z))--p'(y)(y--2-- 2~'[- rl) ] 
U* -- 
vii) Regime (u* = fi, v* = 0): 
Obviously, A~I - 0 and the state variables are given by 
x(t )  = x ° - ~ t and y(t)  = (y0 _ ~) e-*  + ~. 
viii) Regime (u* = fi, v* indetermined): 
The recycler's control is given by 
v*(t) -- (1 -- r2) (c2(y) -- p(y)) -I- (I -- fi) (c2'(y) -- pr(y)) 
(1 -- y) (e2t(y) - - / f (y) )  
=) Regime (u* = ~, v" = ~): 
The state variables are given by 
z(t) = z ° -~t ,  and 
y(t)=e(e-1),(yo fi ) fi ---...-~_. 
1--0 + l -v  
, if u* E [0, ~]. 
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Switching Points: 
A. Estractor's Switching Points 
Analyzing the extractor's strategies backwards, we have to discuss the following three cases: 
1. u*(T) - ft. 
By the costate equations (14) and (15), we obtain 
Ai i (T ) - -d (z (T) ) f ie  - r 'z  < O, and 
Ai~(T) - - f (y (T ) )  fie -r'T > O. 
(14') 
(15') 
Obviously, the dummy variable P12 has to be zero, since z(t) > 0 must apply for all t < T. 
Inequality (14)' implies that there exists a tl ~, such that All(t) > 0 for all t E (tl ' ,T], and a t~ 
such that A12(t) < 0 for all t E (t~', T]; i.e., the extractor's discounted profit is greater than the sum 
of the shadow price for a further unit of the resource remaining unextracted and the (negative) 
shadow price for a further circulating unit of the resource. Suppose tl '  ~ 0 and All(t) > 0 and, 
hence, All(t) < All(tl~), for t < tl ~. ~11 can only change its sign if u - 0 and pl.2 > 0, i.e., 
z ffi 0. In this case, u cannot be greater than zero after this point of time. Hence, A11 < 0 mad 
All(t) > 0 for all t E [0,T]. Suppose, now, tl* to be the point when (p -  cl)e -rz: % AI~ ~_ A11, 
for all t E (t l",t l*),  for a certain t l"  < tl"; i.e., the shadow price of a unit of the resource not to 
be extracted is greater or equal to the sum of the profit and the shadow price of one further unit 
of the resource being in circulation. At tl*, there would be a switching point, from u* - 0 or u* 
indetermined, to u* "- ~. If u* - 0 before tl*, then A l l -  -P12 for t < tl" and, since All cannot 
change its sign, All(t) > 0 must apply for all t E (tl",t~'). A switch at t~* can occur if 
(i) (p - cl) is increasing (since p is increasing due to the decrease of y), because there is no 
extraction and recyclin.g alone cannot induce an increase of y. 
(ii) Ax2 is increasing, i.e., A~2 > 0 for t ~ (t~",tl"). Consequently, 
i f (y )  u* e -~'t + A12 (1 - v) > 0, 
and, hence, AI2 • 0 for all t E (t1",t1*). The extraction rate can switch from zero 
extraction, or from a singular path to maximal extraction, if the shadow price for a further 
circulating unit of the resource becomes greater than the shadow price for an unextracted 
unit of the resource. 
2. u*(T) = 0: 
The costate quations (14) and (15) lead to 
All(T) - -P12, and 
AI~(T) = AI~(T) (1 - v(T)) = 0 (since AI2(T) = 0). (15") 
Equation (15") implies either 
A11(t) = 0, for somet < T, ifz(t) ~ 0, 
or  
A11(t) = -p12 < O, ifz(t) -- 0. 
If AlI -'- 0, there exists a time interval (t1.~r~ where ~11 = 0 BAld "~12 = 0 and, hence, 
(p -  cl)e -r't < 0. If there is a switch at tl, then (p - cl) is decreasing with time in the 
neighbouzhood of i'1, or All is negative before tl and, hence, All(t) > 0 for some t < t'l. This, 
however, implies 
d(z )ue  -~'* -~12 > 0, 
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in contradiction to the assumption c~ < 0; i.e., there is a switch at t, if (2 - c,) decreases. If 
An(t) -- -Pn  < 0, we have z(t) -- 0 for some time interval [i,,~/~, and tl denotes the time of 
total exhaustion. 
3. u(T)  indetennined: 
By the costate Equations (14) and (15) we derive 
in (T )  = d(z )  u* e - ' ' T  < O, 
i n (T )  = -p ' (y)  n* e - ' ' T  + A12(1 - v) :> O, 
and by condition (19h) 
0 = An(T) - A12(T) = (2 -  c,)c -nT .  
Hence, there exists a point {, with ~tll > 0 and A12(t) < 0, for all t E (tl, T], i.e., the shadow of 
a unit of the resource not to be extracted is positive and the shadow price of a further circulating 
unit is negative and hence, either (2-  c,) is positive during ({1,T 1 and decreases faster than 
All --A12. Then u* = fi for t 6 ({1, T]. Or (2 -c , )  is positive and decreases slower than A,1 -A,2,  
then u* = 0 for t 6 (tl,T]. Or (2 -  c,)  = An - A,2, then we have a singular path at the end of 
the time interval considered. 
B. Recycler's Switching Points 
Analogously to the extractor's case, we distinguish the corresponding three cases: 
1. v*(T) = #: 
We obtain, by the costate equation (16), 
)t21(T) = [(c2'(y(T)) - p'(y(T)))fl y (T) + (c2(T) - p(T)) ~] e -r~T. 
a) If )t21(T ) > 0, then A~I < 0 for some t 6 (t2',T1 and, hence, (2 -  c2) > 0 due to 
condition (20c). Consequently, c2'(y(t)) -p'(y(t)) > p(y(t)) -c2(y(t)) > 0, and hence, 
> 
Assume, I) ~ 0 (this is only possible if u* = fi), then the profit (2 - c2) increases and 
there is a switching point at t*, i f -A2,(t*)  = (2(y(t*)) - c2(y(t*)))c -r'~" • 
Assume ~) < 0, then the profit decreases, and hence, there can be no switch. 
b) If Am(T) < 0, then A2,(t) > 0 for t e (t~,T] and one of the three following cases holds. 
(i) (2 - c2) e -r2t > 0, and hence, (2(y) - c2(y)) e -r2t > (c2'(y) - p'(y)) y. Once again 
two cases have to be distiguished: c2' -p '  > 0, i.e., there would be a switch, if 
-A21(t) = (2(y(t)) - c2(y(t))) e -r~t in contradiction to -A21 < 0 and (2 - c2) > 0; 
(ii) (2 -  c2) e -r2t < 0, and hence, (2(y(t)) - c2(y(t))) e - , ' t  + A21 > 0, (see (20c)). By (16), 
one obtains 0 > i21 "- (c21 --Pl) vye-r2t + (c2 -- p)~e -r2t + A21(1 -- 0), and hence, 
(c2' -- ld) < 0, i.e., the decrease of p is stronger than the decrease of c2, and hence, 
there can be a switching point, if y is decreasing. 
(iii) (2 - c2) = 0, and hence, Am = (c2' (y)  - p l (y ) )  ~ y e - r~t  -t- A~I(1 - #) < 0, and conse- 
quently, c2' - p' < 0. This, however, coincides with case (ii). 
c) If A21(T) = 0 and A21(T) = 0, due to the continuity of A21, we have A21 = 0 for all 
t 6 (t~*, T] for a certain t2*. During this period, we have (2 - c2) > 0, and hence, by the 
costate equation (16), 
0 = ),21 = (c2'(y) - p'(y)) y c- 2, _ (2_  c2) 
This yields (c2' - f) y = (2 - c2) > 0. Then we would have a switch, if -A2, = 
(2  - c2) e -r2t, in contradiction to A21 = 0 and p - c2 > 0. 
2. v*(T) indetermined: 
We have, by Equation (20b), and the transversality condition, 
A21(T) = (c2(yCT) )  - pCYCT))) e -r2T = 0, 
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and, by the eostste quation (16), 
A21(T) = (c~'(y(T)) - p'(y(T))) e - 'T .  
a) A21(T) > 0 (and hence, A21 < 0 for some t < T): Since c2'(y(t)) < p'(y(t)), i.e., the costs 
decrease slower than the price, and hence, if y increases (only the eighth regime can occur, 
u* = fi), the difference between p and c2 increases, too, and so, there is a switching point 
from maximal recycling to a singular path, if (p - c2) decreases slower than A21 increases. 
If y decreases (although u* = fi), there is a switching point from zero recycling to a 
singular path if (p - c2) increases slower than A21 increases. 
b) A~I(T) < 0 (and hence, A21 > 0 for some t < T): c2'(y(T)) < P'(u(T)), i.e., the costs 
decrease faster than the price, and hence if y increases--there can he only a switch from 
zero recycling, and if y decreases there can only he a switch from ma~im~| recycling to a 
s.ingnlar path of v*, respectively. 
c) A21(T) = 0 (and hence, A21(t) = 0 for some t < T): c2'(y) =/ / (y )  for some t < T; since 
c2' is decreasing and f is increasing with respect to y, the switching point depends on the 
dynamics of y. 
3. v* (T) = 0: 
We have, by the costate quation (16), A~I(T) = A21(T) = 0, and hence, by the continuity of 
A21 there exists a point {2 such that A2i(t) -= 0 for t 6 ({2,T]. A switching point only exists if 
p(y(t ) )  -- c2(y(t)) > --)t21 e -r2`, fort < t2, 
i.e., y has to decrease and p'(y) > c2'(y ). 
8.$. Stackelberg Eguflibria 
A pair of control functions (u*, v*) is called a Sta~elberg equilibrium with player 1 as leader 
and player 2 as follower, if 
J l (u ' ,  V*) _~ J l (u ,  R2(u)), 
for all feasible u with 
J2(u, a2(u)) = maxJ2(u,v) and V" = R2(U*). t) 
R2 is called the rational reaction function of player 2. 
3.P.1. One State Model 
i) Ez4ractor as Leader 
The follower's Hamiltonian, switching function and costate functions coincide with the corre- 
sponding functions in the Nash case. The leader's Hamiltonian is
H 1 = (p -  cx)uc  - r , '  + ~(u  + (v" - 1)y) 
+ -1 [-v" e- '~'  ((p' - c2') y +p-  c2) + ~20 - ~')]. 
Since H 1 is linear with respect o u and v, we have bang-bang controls, with the switching 
function 
0"l(t) -" (P - -  C1) e-rt* "Jr" ~1,  
and the coetate quations are 
Al(t) = -pt(y)ue - r ' '  ~= AI(1 - v*) + .1 [17" e -rm' ( ( / ' -  c~)y-~- 2 (p ' -  c2'))], 
~,(T)  = 0, and 
Or" [ - ,h  y + e -~'t c ' ~2] px, ~(t) = ~l(V" - 1) + ~q2 ( (P ' -  ~ )Y+P-  c2) + 
v1(O) = O. 
The switching functions coincide with the switching functions of the Nash, so we lutve the same 
six policy regimes as in the Nash case. Since the transition from v* = ~ to the s in~l~ path of 
v* (going backward from T) leads to another costate variable A1, the switching points can be 
different from those in the Nash case, see [3] or [4]. 
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ii) Recycler as Leader 
The follower's H&miltonian, switching function, and costate quation are identical with those 
of the Nash case. The leader's Hamiltonian is 
H 2 -- (p - c2) v y e -r'' q- A2(u* + (v - 1) y) + P2 [-P'(Y) u" e-r" q" AI(1 - v)]. 
The switching function is given by 
a2(t)  = (p - c2) y e -r~t + A2 y - ~i  .2 ,  
and the costate equations are 
i2(t  ) _... [_(pl _ C2') 'v y -- (p -- C2) V]e -r2' -i- A2(1 -- y) "}- .2 f u* e -r2', 
A2(T) = O, and 
/~2(/) -- p2(v - I) -l- ~,OA1 / 
.2(0) = o. 
The bang-bang controls of the recycler are given by 
I 0 "] ( (p - c2) Ye -r2' + A2 y < A1.2, (10a') 
v*(t)  = indetermined / ' if / (p - c2) y e -r~' Jr )~2 Y -" A1.2 (10b') 
(p - c2) ye -r2' + A2 y > AI P2. (10d) 
Since u*= const., we have a," = 0 and hence, 2 :- 0; i.e., actually, we have the same results 
as in the Nash case. 
3.~.~. Two State Model 
i) Eztractor as Leader 
Once again the follower's Hamiltonian, switching function and costate quations coincide with 
the Nash case, and hence, we only mention the leader's ones: 
H i - (p - Cl) u e -r~' - All u ÷ Ai2(u + (v* - I) y) Jr Pn  u + .12 z 
-- P12 [ e-r ' '  ((P' -- c2') V" y -F (p -- c2) V') -[- )t21(V* -- 1)]. 
The switching function is given by 
0"l(t) "- e--rlt (P(~) -- C1('I~)) -- ~11 + ~12 'Jr" "11, 
and the costate quations are 
~12 = e -rffi' [ - - f (Y )  u -1-/~12((p u -- c~) v* y "I- 2v* (pl -- c~))] "l- )t12(1 -- v*),  
_.~ ( ~)* ~ [)t12~_e-r,lv12((pl_ct2)yJc(p_c2)). l. t21] ,>12 = -H i , ,  ~,a~,, / 
An(T) = 0, 
~I2(T)  = 0, 
~12(0) = 0. 
Since the Hamiltonians are again linear with respect o the control variables, the nine policy 
regimes have to be discussed analogously to the Nash case. However, the second state equation 
leads not only to other switching points in comparison with the Nash case, but also to other 
singular paths. For the follower's best response control, v* does also depend on the costate 
variable A21, which has to be considered by the leader's choice of his strategy. 
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ii) Rec~/cler as Leader 
The leader's Hamiltonian is given by 
H 2 -" (p -  c2) vye  -r~t -4- A21(u* -I- (v - 1) y) - ~22u* 
+ ~ [ -p ' (~) , , "  e - ' "  + ~x2(1 - ,,)] + ,'22(¢,(~) u" e -~1' + ~12). 
The switching function is 
t,2 = (p(v) - e2(y)) ~e -r2' + ~21 u - t'2~ ~q2. 
Here, we obtain the costate quations 
~21 - (e2'(y) - f(//)) v y + (c2(y) - p(y) v) e -r2' + .~21(1 - v) + v21 p"(y) u" e-r~t,.~21(T) = 0, 
~22 = -v22 e l (x)  u* e -r'~, 
( 0u* '~ [--A~I + ~2 + (P'(Y) v21 -- c~(z) v22) e-rtt], ~22 = u" + \#~22) 
~22(T) = 0, 
~1(0)  = 0, 
~2(0)  = 0. 
In this case, the four costate quations have to be solved simultaneously in order to obtain the 
singular paths. Analytically, this can be done only with very simplifying assumptions on price 
and cost functions. So a numerical treatment for this problem should be applied, see [5] or [6]. 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The simple model with one state variable with the circulating amount y of the resource, showed 
the result of constant extraction 
u* = ~ 0, if p(y(T)) <_ cl, 
( fi, if p(y(T)) > cl, 
and controls v* like, in the following graph with identical solutions for the Stackelberg equilibrium 
with recycler's leadership. In the other case, the extractor as leader, shows a change of the 
switching point t2 t due to the slopes of the price and cost function c2. 
V 
,X 
t~ 
p(y(T))-c2(Y(T)) > 0 
(p-C2) decreasing 
t 
The coincidence of the Nash equilibria with the Stackelberg equilibria due to the recycler's 
leadership depends crucially on the assumption of constant extraction costs, which causes that 
there is no switching point of the extractor's control function. The model with the two state 
variables hows results that cannot be plotted in this simple way. First, any accumulation of
order of the switching points can occur with regard to the corresponding price and cost functions. 
Second, total exhmmtion of the resource stock z by extraction takes phtee (in the Nash cale), if 
the dem~d ishigh enough to cause high prices for small t. Third, the solution of the Stackelberg 
pmbhnm lead to four timeltaaeo~ differential equations (even by the tfiraplifying amumptions 
of only tWo P lm with ~alar-valued state and control functions) and, ccmsequently, numerical 
treatment of those problems hould be used. 
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